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I. INTRODUCTION

NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 in response to violations of
human rights raises a number of legal and moral questions concerning the right
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of states to respond to humanitarian disasters. The decision by ten NATO
members to intervene without an explicit authorization from the United Nations
Security Council brings to the fore several legal issues relating to the right of
states to impede upon the territorial sovereignty of other states, the balance
between state rights and individual rights, and the role of the Security Council
in controlling the international use of force. The scholarly debate over the
legality of NATO's intervention has not produced a consensus on these issues.
Despite a general agreement on the historical facts involved in the case the legal
community is deeply divided over the most relevant and authoritative legal
principles which should be used to reach a judgement on NATO's actions. As
Pellet correctly notes, the divergent legal positions taken by leading scholars
reflect the different "angles" from which they analyze the same debate.'
While a full legal account of NATO's intervention requires both an
assessment of the onset of the war as well as an analysis of the conduct of
NATO forces once the war had begun, the scope of this article will be limited
to the right of NATO to intervene, as restricted by contemporary jus ad bellum
legal principles. A strict application of the United Nations Charter's
requirement of a Council authorization results in a conclusion that NATO's
intervention in Yugoslavia constitutes a violation of international law, while an
assessment of the intervention that takes into account additional Charter
principles, the totality of Security Council resolutions addressing the situation
in Kosovo, and non-Charter international law provides grounds for a legal
justification for NATO's actions. The International Court of Justice, where
cases by Yugoslavia have been filed against the states involved in the
intervention, will be the final arbiter of which assessment will prevail.
This article begins with an overview of NATO's intervention in 1999. Next, a
review of the evolution of the laws of war is undertaken, with particular
attention paid to the emergence of Charter law and its implications for the
traditional laws of nations. The following section outlines the case filed by
Yugoslavia against the NATO states that participated in the intervention, which
leads to a legal assessment of the intervention. A conclusion section addresses
the chief legal and political issues raised by the NATO intervention in
Yugoslavia and its implications for the progressive development of international
law.
II. THE NATO INTERVENTION
Background information on the Kosovo crisis is well documented in the
literature. Kosovo gained autonomy within the state of Serbia in 1946, and this
special status was confirmed in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. The

1.

Alain Pellet, Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 385 (2000).
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autonomy, however, was revoked in 1989, a move justified by Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic who claimed that the Serb minority in Kosovo was at risk.
Kosovo Albanians, in response, resorted to the development of parallel
institutions to protect the interests of the general population of the province,
along with insurrection tactics aimed at either retaining the province's lost
autonomy or gaining independence from Yugoslavia.
The situation in Kosovo became more explosive after the financial and
governmental collapse in neighboring Albania in 1997, after which men,
materiel and arms flowed freely across the unguarded border. The Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) capitalized on the situation by increasing its attacks on
Yugoslav positions and officials. Yugoslav forces responded with large-scale
attacks on KLA and ethnic Albanian positions, resulting in more than 200,000
Kosovar refugees and displaced persons in 1998 alone. Three United Nations
Security Council resolutions, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, addressed the
situation in Kosovo, regretting the loss of life and qualifying the situation as a
threat to regional peace and security. The Russian Federation emphasized that
despite the reference to Chapter VII no use of force was contemplated, 2 whereas
the United States announced that NATO was planning military operations to
guarantee, if necessary, compliance with the terms of the resolutions. The
military threat pushed the Belgrade government to sign two agreements. The
first agreement, concluded with the OSCE, established the Kosovo Verification
Mission (KVM), which was charged with monitoring compliance with Security
Council Resolution 1199. The second agreement, concluded with NATO,
established a NATO air surveillance mission over Kosovo and defined the main
technical aspects of the operation.
A diplomatic initiative was undertaken in January of 1999, when members
of the Contact Group (France, Italy, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) convened negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and the
Yugoslav government to address a political framework for Kosovo' s autonomy
within Serbia for a three-year period, deferring a final settlement. The
agreement drafted at the Rambouillet conference warned of NATO action in the
event that an interim settlement was not reached. When the Kosovo
representatives accepted the provisions in the Rambouillet Accord and Belgrade
rejected them, NATO commenced its military campaign ostensibly to halt what
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, referred to as "...the systematic,
state-directed murder of other people."4

2.

U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3930 (1998).

3.

Id.at5.

4.
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, Address to the Canadian Senate and House of
Commons, (Apr. 29, 1999).
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On March 24, 1999, NATO launched its air attack against Yugoslavia.
The 78-day attack was commenced in response to failed efforts to negotiate a
political settlement of the crisis over Kosovo's autonomy and the ensuing
humanitarian dilemma in the province. The NATO intervention, labeled
Operation Allied Force, was undertaken with five stated non-negotiable
objectives, as follows:
I.

An end to the killing by Yugoslav army and police forces in
Kosovo;
Withdrawal of those forces;
The deployment of a NATO-led international force;
The return of all refugees; and
A political settlement for Kosovo.5

2.
3.
4.
5.

On the day that the NATO bombing began, President Clinton referenced
three intentions of the intervention, namely, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe,
preserve stability in a key part of Europe, and maintain the credibility of
NATO.6 In the months following the conclusion of the war, United States
Secretary of Defense William Cohen and General Henry Shelton, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave a joint statement before the United States Senate
Armed Services Committee which outlined the following objectives of
Operation Allied Force:
1)
2)
3)

Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to
Belgrade's aggression in the Balkans;
Deter Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic from continuing
and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and create
conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing; and
Damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the
future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or
degrading its ability to wage military operations.7

A common denominator of the three expressions of intent that underpinned
NATO's decision to intervene in Yugoslavia is the objective to end Yugoslav
attacks on innocent civilians. It is upon the humanitarian objective that some
NATO members justified their participation in the intervention.

5.

Christine Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War? 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 845 (1999).

6.

President Bill Clinton, Statement Confirming NATO Air Strikes on Serb Military Targets, FED.
Mar. 24, 1999.

NEWS SERVICE,

7.
William S. Cohen & Henry H. Shelton, Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action Review in the
US Mission to NATO, 6 SECURITY ISSUES DIG. 2 (1999).
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III. THE LAWS OF WAR
The laws that regulate the use of force in international relations date to
antiquity. In contemporary times, the international laws of war were codified
in a series of multilateral treaties that sought to provide specificity to the legal
rights and responsibilities of combatants involved in war. Before outlining the
laws that regulate nations and their combatants, a brief review of the pre-modem
development of the laws of war is provided. That section is followed by an
examination of the laws of war with respect to the right of nations to go to war.
A. The HistoricalEvolution of the Laws of War
Rules that regulate warfare date, at a minimum, to classical Greek times,
with two documented agreements establishing limitations on recourse in time
of war. The first effort is reported by the geographer Strabo, who claimed that
in the course of the War of the Lelantine Plain on the island of Euboea (circa
700 B.C.) the parties to the conflict agreed to ban the use of projectile missiles.8
A second agreement, again limiting combatants in time of war, is found in the
writings of the orator Aeschines, who suggests that after the First Sacred War
(circa 600 B.C.) the victorious states swore never again to cut off besieged
fellow Greeks from food or water.9 While the formal development of the laws
of war during classical Greek times appears to be limited to these two instances,
less formal rules that regulate warfare developed in the form of unwritten
conventions governing interstate conflict. Chief among these rules are the
necessity of a declaration of war, the binding nature of treaties during war, the
respect for non-military symbols, the right to request a return of dead soldiers,
restrictions on the treatment of prisoners of war, and prohibitions on the
10
targeting of non-combatants.
During the Age of Chivalry, the rules that regulate military behavior were
influenced by the Romans, whose principal focus was the regulation of the right
to go to war, which, accordingly, required justification. Stacey notes that the
two central justifications for going to war were defense of frontiers and the
8.

See Everett L. Wheeler, Ephorus and the Prohibitionof Missiles, 117 TRANSACTIONS

AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N, 157 (1987).

9.
JOSIAH OBER, ClassicalGreek Times, in THE LAWS OFWAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 12, 12 (Michael Howard et al., eds., 1994).
10.

For a review of literature relating to the norms of warfare during classical Greek times, see also

FRANK E. ADCOCK & D.J. MOSELEY, DIPLOMACY IN ANCIENT GREECE (St. Martin's Press 1975); YVON
GARLAN, WAR IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (Janet Lloyd trans., W. W. Norton ed., 1975); PIERRE DUCREY,
GUERRE ET GUERRIERS DANS LA GRECE ANTIQUE (Payot 1985); W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT, THE GREEK STATE
AT WAR

(University of California Press 1971);

PETER KARAVITES, CAPITULATIONS AND GREEK INTERSTATE

RELATIONS (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht eds., 1982); and VICTOR D. HANSON, THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1989).
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pacification of barbarians living beyond the frontiers." While the Romans
contributed to the development of the laws of war as they pertain to the right to
initiate conflict, the rules developed during classical Greek times relating to
conduct in time of war were degraded. Prisoners could be enslaved or
massacred, plunder was general, and no distinction was recognized between
combatants and non-combatants.
By the eleventh century, however, the distinction between combatant and
non-combatant began to re-emerge. 2 Knights were regulated in their treatment
of other combatants at a time when the number of combatants was increasing.
By the fourteenth century, the combined effect of knightly practice and legal
theory gave rise to a formal system of military law. Secular in their creation, the
laws of war at the time were little influenced by a more restrictive code of
conduct that emerged from the church. In some ways, the church's position on
the laws of war was more advanced and restrictive than the laws that emerged
from either proclamation or practice of participants. On the issue of the right
to go to war, the church held that for a war to be 'just' it must be preceded by
a declaration issued by a competent authority, fought for a just cause,
proportional, and toward the aim of establishing a condition of peace. The
church's position on the rights and duties of combatants once war had
commenced was much less developed, reflecting the church's primary concern
with the onset of war.
Thus, while the evolution of international law as it pertains to war can be
traced to pre-modem times, the development of a system of laws designed to
regulate both the occurrence and conduct of interstate war remained at a
primitive stage both in theory and practice until modem times. Parker
concludes that most of the modem rules concerning restraint in war did not
appear before the middle of the sixteenth century. 13 The sections that follow
examine the contemporary laws of war, with reference to their post-1500
development. The review focuses on the right of states to enter into war, jus ad
bellum, solely, as that set of laws is essential to undertaking a legal analysis of
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999.
B. Jus ad Bellum
The legal right of states to enter into war has undergone a transformation
over the course of modem history. In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War
(1618-1648) the Treaties of Westphalia ushered in the birth of modem
11.

Robert C. Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN

THE WESTERN WORLD, supra note 9, at 40.
12.

See GLENN R. BUGH, THE HORSEMEN OF ATHENS (Princeton University Press, 1988).

13.

GEOFFERY PARKER, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE

IN THE WESTERN WORLD, supra note 9, at 40.
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international law. Without the overarching presence of the church, which had
imposed a set of binding laws on states within the geographic confines of the
Holy Roman Empire, states were required to negotiate a set of acceptable rules
of military engagement. During the era of legal positivism, which peaked
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and continued to strongly
influence international law during the twentieth century, influential legal
scholars14 upheld the position that recourse to war was a sovereign right of states
and that the competent authority of states enjoyed nearly unfettered competence
de guerre. According to Beck, Arend and Vander Lugt, the essential
characteristic of legal positivism is that international laws are binding only when
grounded firmly in state consent. 15
It was not until the conclusion of the First World War that international law
began to move in the direction of a prohibition of the right of states to enter into
war. Through its justification of the imposition of sanctions on Germany by
maintaining that Germany and its allies were responsible for an act of
aggression, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles characterized aggression as
an illegal act.' 6 Article 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations restricted entry into war to instances when the aim was the
"maintenance of right and justice.' ' 17 The movement to prohibit recourse to war
was furthered by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 18 which bound states not to be
the first to opt for war. The treaty states:
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare ...that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with
one another. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement
or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.' 9

14.

E.g., Johann Jacob Moser, Emerich de Vattel, Richard Zouche, John Austin, and Hans Kelsen.

15.

INTERNATIONAL

RULES: APPROACHES

FROM INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS (Robert J. Beck et al., eds., 1996).
16.

Treaty of Versailles, Art. 231, L.N.T.S. (1919).

17.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15,

para. 7.

18.
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
art.l L.N.T.S. 1.
19.

Id. at art. 2.

82

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 9:75

C. CharterLaw: ContemporaryExtensions of Jus Ad Bellum
It is, however, not until the entry into force of the United Nations Charter
that the international community adopted a general prohibition on the right of
states to go to war. Article 2, paragraph 4, states "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state."" °
On the basis of the principle of non-intervention alone, as espoused in
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, there is no legal recourse to war.
The force of this prohibition has been reiterated and confirmed by a series of
legal documents and agreements. General Assembly Resolution 2131 (1965)
on the inadmissibility of intervention in the internal affairs of states, as well as
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970) stand out in this regard. 2' Further,
the International Court of Justice, in its ruling in the Nicaragua case, reaffirmed
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the United Nations'
prohibition on intervention.22 It can be argued, with reference to the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that the prohibition on resorting to
force has evolved to the point of jus cogens, or compelling law.23
At the same time, Charter law does make exceptions to the general rule that
war is illegal. In three instances, states may legally enter into war: self-defense,
collective self-defense, and authorization by the United Nations Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.2 4 While there
is much disagreement among international lawyers and scholars over precisely
what gives rise to each of these three exceptions to the principle of nonintervention, it is clear that the right of states to go to war was dramatically
restricted by the United Nations Charter.
IV. YUGOSLAVIA'S CLAIMS AGAINST NATO STATES
In response to NATO's bombing campaign, Yugoslavia instituted
proceedings before the International Court of Justice on April 29, 1999, against
the ten NATO members directly involved in the attack.25 Yugoslavia asked the
20.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

21.
G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg. at 20 (1965); G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883rd plen. mtg. at 21-22 (1970) (German version).
22.
23.

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 1.

24.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (The right of self-defense is established in Article 51. The Security
Council is empowered by Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, which states that the Council "shall
determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and then decides on
the necessary coercive measures "to maintain or restore international peace and security.")
25. ,Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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court to hold each of the respondents individually responsible for certain
breaches of international law arising from their participation in the air
campaign. The Yugoslav case centered upon a series of alleged violations of
the law of nations, specifically:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

The obligation not to violate the sovereignty of another state;
The obligation banning the use of force against another state;
The obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of another
state;
The obligation to protect the civilian population and civilian
objects in wartime;
The obligation to protect the environment;
The obligation relating to free navigation on international rivers;
The obligation to respect fundamental human rights and
freedoms;
The obligation not to use prohibited weapons; and
The obligation not to deliberately inflict conditions of life
calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national group.

Simultaneously, Yugoslavia submitted requests for the indication of
provisional measures asking the Court to order each of the respondents to "cease
immediately acts of use of force" and to "refrain from any act of threat or use
of force" against Yugoslavia.26 The allegations submitted by Yugoslavia against
the NATO powers cover a vast range of international law, including the laws of
war and human rights law. Since the scope of this article is to limited to the
legal restrictions on states relating to the onset of war, only the first three
alleged breaches are relevant.
In order to establish the Court's jurisdiction in each of the ten cases
submitted, Yugoslavia invoked various bases of jurisdiction, including:
1) Article 36, paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute in the cases against
Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom;
2) Article 38, paragraph 5 of the Rules of Court in the cases
3)

4)

against France, Germany, Italy, and the United States;
Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the cases against all
ten respondents;
Article 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement
and Arbitration between Belgium and the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia (1930); and

26.
Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, 1999, I.C.J. No. 114 (June 2), available at http: //www.icj-cij.org.
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Article 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement
and Arbitration between the Netherlands and the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia (193 1).27

The Court rejected Yugoslavia's requests for the indication of provisional
measures on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction prima facie. The Court's
rejection of the request for provisional measures by Yugoslavia to require the
respondents to cease the military campaign was a serious blow to Yugoslavia's
attempt to end the conflict, however, it did not affect the underlying issues
relating to the legal status of the NATO intervention. In that regard, the Court
declared itself profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia, which
"under the present circumstances ...
raises very serious issues of international
28
law." It emphasized that all parties before it must act in conformity with their
obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of international
law, including humanitarian law." Finally, the Court reminded the parties that
they should take care not to aggravate or extend the dispute between them and
that, when such a dispute gives rise to a breach of the peace, the United Nations
Security Council has special responsibilities under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter."
The underlying claim that NATO members violated the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was not dismissed, save for the cases against
Spain and the United States on the ground that the Court was manifestly without
jurisdiction in the two cases since neither state had signed the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction clause without reservation. The cases brought by
Yugoslavia against the eight remaining NATO respondents, therefore, remains
on the Court's docket.
V. THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE BY NATO

DURING THE Kosovo WAR

A determination of the legal status of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia
in 1999 depends on a consideration of several issues, namely:
1) The extent to which international law3 upholds the sovereign
rights and territorial integrity of states; '

27.

Id.

28.

ld. at$17.

29.

Id. at M 19, 48.

30.

Id. at W 37-38, 49-50.

31.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.

Morton

20021
2)

3)
4)
5)

6)

The impact of the rise of individual rights, as reflected in
contemporary human rights law, on the sovereign rights of
states;
The legal restrictions placed ol states to prohibit the use of
32
military force against other states;
The role of the UN Security Council in controlling the
33
international use of force;
The interpretation of Security Council authorization of activity
short of the use of force in response to threats to regional or
international peace and security; and
Security Council post facto treatment of unauthorized uses of
force.

While the aforementioned issue areas provide a definitive set of criteria
upon which a determination of the legal status of NATO's intervention in
Yugoslavia can be based, a final judgment of NATO's action depends on one's
interpretation of Council resolutions, core Charter principles, legal principles
embodied in traditional (pre-Charter) international law, and the legal obligations
of states. As Falk remarks, "...the NATO initiative on behalf of the Kosovars
has provoked extremely divergent interpretations of what was truly at stake, the
prudence of what was undertaken, and the bearing of law and morality on this
34
course of events.,
At the heart of the debate are the values believed to be central to the world
community. On this point, Cassese notes that "in the current framework of the
international community, three sets of values underpin the overarching system
of interstate relations: peace, human rights, and self-determination." 3 While
legal scholars may concur with Cassese as to the three principle values
underpinning interstate relations, there is disagreement over which of the values
prevail over the others. At the time of the drafting of the United Nations
Charter in 1945, it can be readily concluded that the "peace among nations"
value predominated.
This proposition is strengthened by the Charter's
restrictive position taken on the right of states to use force in their international
relations, the territorial integrity of nation-states, and the Security Council's
monopoly on the authorization of force except in the case of self-defense.

32.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

33.

U.N. CHARTER art. 33, 42.

34.
Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 847, 847 (1999).
35.
Anthony Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J.INT'L L. 23, 24 (1999). (The
"peace" that Cassese refers to would more accurately be termed "peace among nations" in order to distinguish
it from "peace within nations.")

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

86

[Vol. 9:75

Prioritizing interstate stability comes at the expense of intrastate stability, as
exemplified by the Security Council's non-involvement in numerous internal
conflicts during the Cold War era.
Since the framing of the Charter, however, international human rights laws
have been codified and have entered into force. The drafting of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, considered by many to have entered into custom,
the entry into force of the Genocide Convention, and the codification of
numerous human rights conventions,36 reflect a jurisprudence challenge to the
notion that the peace among nations value prevails over the human rights
value.37 Since the Security Council's monopoly on non-defensive uses of force
is based on the view that the peace among nations value takes priority over other
values, it can be argued that the emergence of international human rights erodes
the centrality of the Council in determining the legitimacy of intervention in
support of human rights.
In performing a legal analysis of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999,
therefore, we are confronted with a dilemma. Do we strictly apply the United
Nations Charter as it was drafted in 1945, with its preference for peace among
nations over alternative values such as human rights? Do we allow a more
liberal application of the Charter as it relates to the process of attaining Security
Council authorization for intervention? Do we take into account the postCharter development of human rights law and its implication for the use of force
in response to humanitarian disasters? Is the NATO intervention in Kosovo
simply another of a long list of post-World War H military interventions that a
strict interpretation of Charter law deems illegal, or is it instead a watershed
event that ushers in a new era of legally acceptable humanitarian interventions
that do not require Security Council authorization? Hilpold states that the
NATO intervention may constitute the most far-reaching challenge to the

36.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 1, (1948),

available at http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html; see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 A (IMl)(1948); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, G.A.
Res. 640 (VII) (1952); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Jan. 4, 1969,660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenanton Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (1966);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/eedaw/; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989),
at http://www.unicef.org/crc/introduction.htm; (for an exhaustive list of international human rights documents,
see THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

1945-1995 (United Nations Department of Public

Information, 1995)).

37.

I leave out of this discussion the self-determination value since, in my opinion, self-

determination, despite a widespread acknowledgment of its existence in contemporary international law, has
not risen to the level of the peace among nations or human rights values.

2002]

Morton

doctrine on non-intervention. 38 These are difficult questions that cannot be
answered definitively at the present. There is no broad consensus among legal
experts on the subject. The amount of scholarly attention paid to a legal
assessment of NATO's intervention, however, underscores the vitality of the
debate and signals that this jurisprudence debate is not over.39
Three distinct analyses of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia are
presented below. The first, reflecting a strict interpretation of Charter law's
restriction on the use of force, leads to the conclusion that NATO members
acted outside the bounds of international law in intervening in Yugoslavia in
1999. Simma reflects a strict interpretation of Charter law when he states:
[I]f the Security Council determines that massive violations of human
rights occurring within a country constitute a threat to the peace, and
then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to
these violations, a humanitarian intervention by military means is
permissible. In the absence of such authorization, military
coercion ...constitutes a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter.4"
The second analysis, which reads more liberally into Charter principles as
they relate to the process by which authorization for intervention is granted,
takes into account implied Security Council authorization for intervention, a
failed effort by the Russian Federation to formally label the intervention as
illegal, and a Council resolution adopted after the Kosovo War was completed.
Working within Charter law, this perspective makes possible the argument that
NATO members, despite the lack of an explicit Security Council authorization
38.
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to intervene militarily, did not violate international law. Falk supports this more
liberal interpretation of Charter processes, contending that "[s]o long as a purely
textual analysis of the relevant norms is relied upon, the divergences between
humanitarian imperatives and the prohibition of forcible intervention
unauthorized by the United Nations cannot be satisfactorily reconciled."'"
The third analysis moves beyond Charter law, taking into account the
totality of the unfolding situation in Kosovo, and recognizes the erosion of state
sovereignty as a result of the rise of human rights. Reisman represents this
perspective when he states that while "...all appreciate that NATO's action in
Kosovo did not accord with the design of the United Nations Charter ...a
judgment must be made in light of the law at stake, the facts and feasible
alternatives at the moment of the decision. 42
A. A Strict Application of CharterPrinciplesRelating to the Use of Force
Since 1945 international law, as reflected in the United Nations Charter,
prohibits the use of force except in three instances: self-defense, collective selfdefense, and after authorization by the United Nations Security Council. A
determination of the legality of the NATO intervention, therefore, requires the
application of the three Charter exceptions to the principle of non-intervention.
1. Self-defense and Collective Self-defense
The right of self-defense is firmly rooted in the United Nations Charter, as
reflected in Article 51, which states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations ...
It is commonly recognized that unless a humanitarian crisis transcends
international borders and leads to armed attacks against other states, recourse to
Article 51 [self-defense and collective self-defense] is not available." Any
effort to expand the concept of self-defense to include the right to grant
emergency help to a people that is victim of an oppressive government has no
basis in international law. It is clear, therefore, that a justification of the NATO
intervention in 1999 cannot be found in an application of either self-defense or
collective self-defense.

41.
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2. Security Council Authorization
The determination of the legal status of the intervention from a strict
interpretation of the Charter, therefore, rests on the presence or absence of an
authorization issued by the Security Council. Scholars that base their legal
assessment of NATO's intervention on a strict interpretation of Charter
provisions conclude that the use of force by NATO members constitutes a
violation of international law.45
The Security Council addressed the deteriorating situation in Kosovo in a
series of meetings in 1998 that resulted in three resolutions prior to the onset of
NATO's aerial campaign. In its first resolution on the topic, the Security
Council condemned the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against
civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by
the Kosovo Liberation Army.46 Resolution 1160 also called upon the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to take the necessary steps to achieve a political
solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement the actions
indicated by the Contact Group in its statements dated March 9 and March 25,
1998. The resolution prohibited the sale or supply of weapons, ammunition,
military vehicles, equipment, and spare parts to Yugoslavia. The first Security
Council resolution contained two important guidelines relating to the future
international response to the situation in Kosovo. In a preambular clause, which
was restated in operative clause five, the Security Council affirmed the
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. In so doing, the Council denied any right of intervention at that
time. The affirmation of Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity,
however, was balanced by a warning found in operative clause nineteen, which
emphasized that a failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful
resolution of the situation in Kosovo "will lead to the consideration of additional
measures."47 It is clear that the first Security Council Resolution on Kosovo
does not provide an authorization for military intervention.
A second Security Council resolution was passed on 23 September 1998,
in response to intense fighting in Kosovo that resulted in numerous civilian
casualties and 230,000 displaced persons.4 8 The resolution underlined the
responsibility of Yugoslavia to create the conditions necessary for the return of
refugees and displaced persons. While Resolution 1199 reaffirmed the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, it also emphasized the need
to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo were respected. The
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second Security Council resolution, moving in the direction of an authorization
for intervention, affirmed that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo constituted
a threat to peace and security. The rights of states to address the situation were
limited by Resolution 1199, however, to the provision of available personnel to
fulfil the responsibility of effective and continuous international monitoring in
Kosovo, the provision of adequate resources for humanitarian assistance, and
the application of the principles embodied in Resolution 1160. The Security
Council again decided that "should the concrete measures demanded in
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 not be taken, to consider further actions and
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region."'4 9
In its third resolution, the Security Council expressed its concern and alarm
over the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. 50 The resolution also reiterated the
commitment of Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia. The Council's endorsement of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia was qualified but not undermined by the thirteenth
operative of Resolution 1203, which states: "Urges Member States and others
concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the
region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the
Kosovo Crisis."'"
Cassese notes that the action of NATO countries radically departs from the
Charter system for collective security, "which hinges on a rule (collective
enforcement action authorized by the Security Council) and an exception (selfdefense). 52 Lobel and Ratner argue that, as a result of Article 2(4), explicit and
not implicit Security Council authorization is necessary before a nation may use
force that does not derive from the right of self-defense under Article 5 1.53
They continue by noting that "[r]equiring clear Security Council authorization
acts as a brake on the use of force by the international community: it is a
procedural condition designed to fulfill the Charter's substantive goal of
ensuring that force be employed only when absolutely necessary. '5 4 Simma,
while recognizing that NATO's action was in response to gross violations of
human rights,55 concludes that countermeasures to such atrocities must not
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involve the threat or use of force, a legal position confirmed by the General
Assembly's Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970.56
In the midst of the military campaign, the Security Council drafted and
passed Resolution 1239 (1999) which effectively avoided a comment on
NATO's actions.57 The resolution commended the efforts of member states, the
UNHCR, and other international relief organizations in providing relief
assistance to the Kosovo refugees and urged all concerned to work towards the
aim of a political solution to the crisis. At the conclusion of the aerial
bombardment, the Security Council addressed the situation in Kosovo and
passed Resolution 1244 (1999), which established an international security
presence in Kosovo with express responsibility to:
a)

b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)

Deter renewed hostilities, maintain and where necessary enforce
a cease-fire, and ensure the withdrawal and prevent the return
into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces;
Demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA);
Establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons could return home;
Ensure public safety and order;
Supervise demining;
Support the work of the international civil presence;
Conduct border monitoring duties; and
Ensure the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international
organizations.58

The opinion of the ICJ on the matter of the legal status of NATO's
intervention will weigh heavily upon the international legal community. While
the Court has yet to render a decision in Yugoslavia v. NATO members, its first
pronouncements indicate that it is not willing to set aside the Charter's
prohibition on the use of force in favor of a right of humanitarian intervention,
as it declared itself to be "profoundly concerned with the use of force in
Yugoslavia" and that "under the present circumstances such use raises very
serious issues of international law. 59
The conclusion that NATO's actions constitute a violation of core
principles of international law and, as a result, must be categorized as illegal
56.
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reflects a strict adherence to Charter Law as it was initially codified, reluctant
to take into account norms or legal developments since 1945.
B. A LiberalAnalysis of CharterLaw
To conclude that the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 absent of
explicit Security Council authorization was a legal act requires a closer
examination of the actions of the Council as they relate to the unfolding
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and a consideration of alternative
interpretations of Charter provisions as they relate to Council authorization for
intervention. It is clear that the Security Council did not explicitly authorize
states to use force to relieve the Kosovo population of its humanitarian plight.
In fact, in each Council resolution the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia were explicitly upheld. Therefore, to contend that NATO acted in
accord with prevailing international laws and norms, a more liberal
interpretation of Charter principles as they relate to the process of authorized
intervention must be undertaken.
1. Ambiguous Authorization
While an explicit Security Council authorization to use force is a central
requirement of a strict interpretation of the United Nations Charter, the
ambiguous nature of Council resolutions historically has given rise to the notion
that authorization may exist despite the absence of an explicit Council
authorization. Lobel and Ratner note that the Iraqi inspections crisis of 1998
raises similar questions relating to state intervention on the basis of an
ambiguous Council authorization to use force.6 ° In the Iraqi case, the United
States and the United Kingdom asserted the right to use force in order to enforce
inspections of weapons facilities based on Resolution 678 (1990), which
authorized the use of force to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi control. 6' In the
Kosovo case, United States officials argued that the mere invocation of Charter
Chapter VII with regard to the Kosovo situation was sufficient to authorize a
resort to force. 62 The Dutch representative on the Security Council contended
that Resolution 1203 clearly stated that the Council was acting under Chapter
VIII of the Charter and that NATO action followed directly from Resolution
1203.63
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2. The Council's Refusal to Deem NATO's Actions Illegal
Scholars have referenced the fact that the Security Council explicitly
rejected the proposition that NATO's actions were illegal. 64 A resolution
sponsored by the Russian Federation declaring that the NATO action was
unlawful and directed that it be terminated was supported by only three states-Russia, China, Namibia-and was rejected by the remaining twelve Council
members.65 Thus, while no one contends that the Security Council specifically
authorized the NATO intervention, Wedgwood recognizes that the omission of
a Council authorization represents the unwillingness of Russia to endorse
NATO's actions, which would have undermined Russia's influence over an
issue that directly involved its interests.66 Speaking before the vote, the Russian
representative stated that the aggressive military action taken by NATO was a
threat to international peace and security and grossly violated key provisions of
the United Nations Charter. The United States representative, also speaking
before the resolution was voted on, focused attention on the actions of
Yugoslavia, stating that the Charter did not sanction armed assaults on ethnic
groups or imply that the world should turn a blind eye to a growing
humanitarian disaster. Canada's position was that the supporters of the Russian
resolution placed themselves outside of the international consensus which held
that "...the time had come to stop the continued violence perpetrated by the
67
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against its own people.,
3. Ex Post Facto Authorization
While strict Charter advocates claim that explicit Security Council
authorization for non-defensive uses of force must be granted priorto the onset
of war, more liberal interpretations allow for Council authorization ex post
facto, or after the fact. Much attention has been paid to Security Council
Resolution 1244, which was passed after the aerial campaign had ended and an
agreement on the resolution of the Kosovo situation had been concluded.
Resolution 1244 (1999), as Pellet notes, dramatically changed the picture.68
While it did not formally declare that NATO's intervention was lawful, it
clearly endorsed the consequences of the intervention. Pellet concludes that
"...there certainly were doubts as to the legality of NATO's action before 10
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/l1999/19990326.sc6659.html.
64.
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June 1999, [h]owever, when put together, the arguments in favor of its
lawfulness become persuasive-and particularly so in light of Resolution
1244. i69
4. Regional Responses to Threats to the Peace
Further support for a legal defense of NATO' s intervention can be found
in Charter Article 52(1), which provides:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations.7'
Pellet concludes that NATO's intervention is an illustration of "regional or
collective unilateralism."'" He continues by arguing that actions taken by
groups of states imply some checks and balances, both in the decision-making
72
process and in action that purely unilateral interventions cannot.
A problem created by Article 52(1) is that, in the event of what Lobel and
Ratner refer to as "contracting out" by the Security Council to individual
member states or regional organizations to revolve a dilemma, the Council
leaves states with wide discretion to use ambiguous, open-textured resolutions
to exercise control over the initiation, conduct and termination of hostilities.73
This problem is reflected in attempts by United States officials, in particular, to
claim that the mere invocation of Charter Chapter VII with regard to the Kosovo
situation was sufficient to authorize the resort to force.
The crucial question, however, remains the conditions under which a
regional organization can carry out enforcement actions pursuant to subsequent
Charter Article 53(1), which addresses the degree of control that the Security
Council ought to exercise over such operations. Gazzini notes that Article 53(1)
introduces a distinction between the utilization of regional organizations by the
Security Council and the autonomous enforcement by regional organizations
acting upon a Security Council authorization. 74 The scholarly community
remains divided on this later, and most crucial, point. Some claim a strict
69.
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control by the Council, including the start-up, supervision, and termination of
enforcement actions," while others recognize that under certain circumstances,
such as genocide, an implicit authorization or ex postfacto authorization by the
Council may suffice. 7 6 In any case, Article 54 imposes upon regional
organizations the obligation to keep the Security Council fully informed on the
activities they contemplate to undertake or have already undertaken.
C. Extra-CharterInternationalLaw
The strongest case for the legality of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia
in 1999 is made with reference to extra-Charter international law. This position
rejects the notion that international law begins and ends with the entry into force
of the United Nations Charter, recognizing that pre-Charter legal principles and
post-1945 legal developments provide states with certain rights and duties
irregardless of the provisions laid down in the UN Charter.
1. Humanitarian Intervention
Hilpold notes that "...the events in the first half of 1999 reanimated the old
discussions of whether there is a right to humanitarian intervention in
international law."77 Perhaps the strongest argument supporting the legality of

NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia is one that rests on a perceived
humanitarian intervention right. Wedgwood concurs that "humanitarian
necessity" remains the core of NATO's justification for military force in
Kosovo and, as noted earlier, was an expressed objective in every major NATO
statement on the intervention.78 Chinkin confirms that several official
statements by NATO members reference the humanitarian interest in
intervening in Yugoslavia in 1999. 79 Schachter reflects the humanitarian
intervention perspective when he writes that "Even in the absence of ...prior
approval [by the Security Council], a state or group of states using force to put
an end to atrocities when the necessity is evident and the humanitarian intention
is clear is likely to have its action pardoned."8
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This legal justification for NATO's intervention is strongest because it
reduces the role of the Security Council in authorizing the non-defensive use of
force, the linchpin of the strict Charter interpretation school. The humanitarian
intervention defense requires differentiating Charter Law from traditional
international law, recognizing the two as concurrent legal systems albeit with
substantial overlap. Even though both bodies of legal rules function in a similar
way in many respects, Pellet observes that this does not mean that the Charter
mechanisms are part of the general law of international responsibility or that
both regimes are entirely intermingled. 8 He continues by noting that "...some
arguments in favor of NATO's intervention ...can ...
be based on the law of state
responsibility," a distinct yet complimentary legal regime that co-exists with
Charter Law. 2
A legal justification of NATO's intervention on humanitarian grounds is
supported by what French scholars have termed the devoir d'ingerence,or duty
to intervene in response to a humanitarian catastrophe.
Advocates of the
principle contend that regardless of the cause of a humanitarian catastrophe,
external actors have a right and/or duty to intervene. Initially, the doctrine was
designed to justify an intervention by humanitarian NGOs, however; its leading
proponents have more recently attempted to extend the duty of intervention to
states.
The humanitarian intervention defense, while not well-grounded in
contemporary international law, led Hilpold to observe that "NATO's
intervention in Kosovo has brought about a flurry of contributions in the legal
literature suggesting the need to take a completely different stance towards the
perennial controversial subject of humanitarian intervention." '
Cassese
provides a series of conditions, which could give rise to the right of
humanitarian intervention even in the absence of any authorization by the
Security Council, as follows:
i)

Gross and egregious breaches of human rights involving loss of
life of hundreds or thousands of innocent people, and amounting
to crimes against humanity, are carried out on the territory of a
sovereign state, either by the central governmental authorities
or with their connivance and support, or because of the total
collapse of such authorities cannot impede those atrocities;
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ii)

iii)

iv)

v)

vi)

If the crimes against humanity result from anarchy in a
sovereign state, proof is necessary that the central authorities
are utterly unable to put an end to those crimes, while at the
same time refusing to call upon or to allow other states or
international organizations to enter the territory to assist in
terminating the crimes. If, on the contrary, such crimes are the
work of the central authorities, it must be shown that those
authorities have consistently withheld their cooperation from
the United Nations or other international organizations, or have
systematically refused to comply with appeals,
recommendations or decisions of such organizations;
The Security Council is unable to take any coercive action to
stop the massacres because of disagreement among the
Permanent Members or because one or more of them exercises
its veto power. Consequently, the Security Council either
refrains from any action or only confines itself to deploring or
condemning the massacres, plus possibly terming the situation
a threat to the peace;
All peaceful avenues which may be explored consistent with the
urgency of the situation to achieve a solution based on
negotiation, discussion, and any other means short of force have
been exhausted, notwithstanding which, no solution can be
agreed upon by the parties to the conflict;
A group of states decides to try to halt the atrocities, with the
support or at least the non-opposition of the majority of Member
States of the United Nations;
Armed force is exclusively used for the limited purpose of
stopping the atrocities and restoring respect for human rights,
not for any goal going beyond this limited purpose.
Consequently, the use of force must be discontinued as soon as
this purpose is attained. Moreover, it is axiomatic that use of
force should be commensurate with and proportionate to the
human rights exigencies on the ground. The more urgent the
situation of killings and atrocities, the more intensive and
immediate may be the military in response thereto. Conversely,
military action would not be warranted in the case of a crisis
which is slowly unfolding and which still presents avenues for
diplomatic resolution aside from armed confrontation.85

Application of the aforementioned criteria to the situation in Kosovo in the
period leading up to NATO's intervention provides a strong justification for
NATO's resort to force. For each criterion, a compelling case can be made for
humanitarian intervention.
85.
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2. Intervention in Response to Genocide
The principal obstacle to establishing a right of humanitarian intervention,
even under the conditions forwarded by Cassese, is that states could abuse the
right in order to provide legal cover for interventions that serve their own
narrow self-interest. 86 The fear historically has been that once granted, a right
of humanitarian intervention would so undermine state sovereignty that the
institution of international law would be rendered ineffective. What is possible,
however, is an established right of humanitarian intervention in extreme cases,
most notably in response to genocide. Justification for the assertion that
protections afforded under the doctrine of state sovereignty are called into
question in the event of the commission of the crime of genocide is found in
Falk, who states that "genocidal behavior cannot be shielded by claims of
sovereignty...
It is established in international law that genocide constitutes an erga
omnes offense, making it a concern of all states.88 Consequently, in the event
of the crime of genocide, every state may lawfully consider itself injured and is
thus entitled to resort to countermeasures against the perpetrator. Simma
concludes that "[iun the face of genocide, the right of states, or collectivities of
states, to counter breaches of human rights most likely becomes an
obligation."89 Support for this contention is found in the judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the 1996 case brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina
90
against Yugoslavia.
Lobel and Ratner, who label NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia as a
violation of international law, nonetheless open the door to the possibility of
unauthorized intervention in response to genocide. 9' They state that "[biut in
the extreme case of an ongoing genocide for which the Security Council will not
authorize force, perhaps the formal law ought to be violated to achieve the
higher goal of saving thousands or millions of lives." They continue by stating
that "[s]ilence by the Security Council might then reflect a community
consensus that the legal requirement for its authorization ought to give way to
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the moral imperative. 9 2 Franck and Rodley provide support of the
humanitarian intervention defense without recognizing an existing norm or rule
in international law that permits it.93 They state that "In exceptional
circumstances ...a large power may indeed go selflessly to the rescue of a
foreign people facing oppression. But surely no general law is needed to cover
such actions."94
VI. CONCLUSION

The anticipated implications of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia for the
progressive development of international law and order are divergent, reflecting
the three schools of thought on the right of state intervention. If the prevailing
legal opinion is that the intervention, by virtue of its lack of Council
authorization, constitutes a violation of international law, the principal
implication is that the rights of individuals remain subservient to the rights of
states.
If, however, a consensus develops around the proposition that NATO
actions in response to the Kosovo crisis were legal, despite the absence of a
formal Security Council authorization, the international legal order will have
undergone a significant revision. Wedgwood notes that the war over Kosovo
may mark the end of Security Council "classicism," and the emergence of a
limited and conditional right of humanitarian intervention, permitting the use
of force to protect the lives of a threatened population when the decision is
taken by what most of the world would recognize as a responsible multilateral
organization and the Security Council does not oppose the action.95 Cassese
claims that "this particular instance of a breach of international law may
gradually lead to the crystallization of a general rule of international law
authorizing armed countermeasures for the exclusive purpose of putting an end
to large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and constituting
a threat to the peace. '9 6 Gazzini claims that a process of reinterpreting Article
2(4) is underway, and has been gaining ground since post-Cold War military
activities took place in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and Liberia.97 While
state practice remains insufficiently consistent to make a broad-based claim on
the emergence of an international norm allowing intervention in response to
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humanitarian disasters, a determination that NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia
in 1999 was legal would represent a continuation of the trend since 1990. What
distinguishes the Kosovo case from those that preceded it is that, in the previous
cases, there was no claim that intervention was permissible absent of a Security
Council authorization. Finally, the Secretary General's call for Council action
to meet future humanitarian crises may draw support for what he referenced as
the development of an "international norm in favor of intervention to protect
civilians from wholesale slaughter."98 Pellet concludes that it is essential that
new 'community' mechanisms be found in the future in order to avoid being
restricted to a choice between unqualified respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of a state committing gross violations of human rights, on the
one hand, and the right of intervention without Security Council authorization,
on the other. 99
What is clear from a review of the literature on the legal status of NATO's
intervention in Yugoslavia is that very few scholars provide unqualified
conclusions on the legality or illegality of the intervention. The majority of
scholars that qualify the intervention as a violation of international law
recognize that a counter case can be made. Simma, for example, despite his
contention that NATO violated Charter Law, seems to consider that the
intervention was "not that much illegal."' 00 At the same time, those that
conclude that NATO's actions reflect the emergence of a new legal norm
permitting intervention without an explicit Security Council authorization to do
so recognize the general United Nations prohibition on the use of force.
Cassese downplays the illegality of the intervention, stating that "...any person
deeply alert to and concerned with human rights must perforce see that
important moral values militated for the NATO military action."''
And, it
appears, the lines dividing the scholarly community are not static. Hilpold
observes that "[t]he number of writers criticizing the concept of a right to
humanitarian intervention-once decisively preponderant-seems to dwindle;
even writers with a long record of opposition against such a legal right were
looking for suitable justifications."'' 0 2 It is also evident that the Kosovo case is
not an exception, but rather another critical example of a rapidly changing norm
of international law that places human rights on par with, or at exceptional
times, superior to states rights. At present, Slobodan Milosevic stands trial on
98.
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sixty-six counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, all
committed while he was head of state. Prior to that, but also recently, it was
determined that head of state immunity for Augusto Pinochet was superceded
by recent human rights conventions, despite the fact that the crimes charged
against him occurred while he was the head of state of Chile. If the
international community is willing to sacrifice classic principles of immunity
in order to uphold emerging principles of human rights, sacrificing state
sovereignty to uphold the same principles is a matter of degree and does not
represent a fundamental shift in legal thinking. As was evident in the judgment
in the Nicaragua Case, the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force is a legal
principle that is subject to change as the result of the development of a
customary law norm.

